Tet Offensive free essay sample

The Johnson administration employed a policy of minimum candor† in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the medias coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed. In November 1967 Westmoreland spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support. In a speech before the National Press Club he said that a point in the war had been reached where the end comes into view. Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmorelands predictions were trumped by Tet. The American media, which had been largely supportive of U. S. efforts, rounded on the Johnson administration for what had become an increasing credibility gap. Despite its military failure, the Tet Offensive became a political victory and ended the career of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to run for re-election. Johnsons approval rating slumped from 48 to 36 percent. As James Witz noted, Tet contradicted the claims of progress made by the Johnson administration and the military. The Tet Offensive was the turning point in Americas involvement in the Vietnam War. It had a profound impact on domestic support for the conflict. The Conflict at Home Some advocates within the peace movement advocated a unilateral withdrawal of U. S. forces from Vietnam. One reason given for the withdrawal is that it would contribute to a lessening of tensions in the region and thus less human bloodshed. Early opposition to U. S. involvement in Vietnam was centered around the Geneva conference of 1954. American support of Diem in refusing elections was thought to be thwarting the very democracy that America claimed to be supporting. John Kennedy, while Senator, opposed involvement in Vietnam. Opposition to the Vietnam War tended to unite groups opposed to U. S. anti-communism, imperialism and colonialism and, for those involved with the New Left such as the Catholic Worker Movement, capitalism itself. Others, such as Stephen Spiro opposed the war based on the theory of Just War. Some wanted to show solidarity with the people of Vietnam, such as Norman Morrison emulating the actions of Thich Qu? ng D? c. Some critics of U. S. withdrawal predicted that it would not contribute to peace but rather vastly increase bloodshed. These critics advocated U. S. forces remain until all threats from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army had been eliminated. Advocates of U. S. withdrawal were generally known as doves, and they called their opponents hawks, following nomenclature dating back to the War of 1812. High-profile opposition to the Vietnam War turned to street protests in an effort to turn U. S. political opinion. On 15 October 1969, the Vietnam Moratorium attracted millions of Americans. The fatal shooting of four students at Kent State University led to nation-wide university protests. Riots broke out at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. After explosive news reports of American military abuses, such as the 1968 My Lai Massacre, brought new attention and support to the anti-war movement, some veterans joined Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Anti-war protests ended with the final withdrawal of troops after the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1973. South Vietnam was left to defend itself alone when the fighting resumed. Many South Vietnamese subsequently fled to the United States. Nixon Expands the War The invasion of Cambodia sparked nationwide U. S. protests. Four students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University during a protest in Ohio, which provoked public outrage in the United States. The reaction to the incident by the Nixon administration was seen as callous and indifferent, providing additional impetus for the anti-war movement. Vietnamization Severe communist losses during the Tet Offensive allowed U. S. President Richard Nixon to begin troop withdrawals. His plan, called the Nixon Doctrine, was to build up the ARVN, so that they could take over the defense of South Vietnam. The policy became known as Vietnamization. Vietnamization had much in common with the policies of the Kennedy administration. One important difference, however, remained. While Kennedy insisted that the South Vietnamese fight the war themselves, he attempted to limit the scope of the conflict. Vietnamization was a policy of the Richard M. Nixon administration during the Vietnam War, as a result of the Viet Congs Tet Offensive, to expand, equip, and train South Vietnams forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U. S. combat troops. This referred to U. S. combat troops specifically in the ground combat role, but did not reject combat by U. S. air forces, as well as the support to South Vietnam, consistent with the policies of U. S. foreign military assistance organizations. U. S. citizens? mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U. S. soldiers massacring civilians at My Lai (1969), the invasion of Cambodia (1970), and the leaking of the Pentagon Papers (1971). After Nixons election in 1968, Vietnamization became the policy of the United States. While it was a deliberate policy, the name was rather accidental. At a January 28, 1969, meeting of the National Security Council, GEN Andrew Goodpaster, deputy to GEN Creighton Abrams, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, said the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) had been steadily improving, and the point at which the war could be de-Americanized was close. Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, agreed with the point, but not with the language: what we need is a term like Vietnamizing to put the emphasis on the right issues. Nixon immediately liked Lairds word. Vietnamization fit into the broader Nixon Administration detente policy, in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as containment of Communism, but a cooperative world order in which Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger were basically realists in world affairs, interested in the broader constellation of forces, and the biggest powers. Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate basic U. S. -Soviet policy between the heads of state via Kissinger and Dobrynin, with the agreements then transferred to diplomats for implementation. In like manner, Nixon opened high-level contact with China. U. S. relations with the Soviet Union and China were seen as far more important than the fate of South Vietnam, which certainly did not preclude South Vietnam maintaining its own independence. Nixon said Vietnamization had two components. The first was strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills. The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam. The first was achievable, but it would take time. For the U. S. , it was trivial to have a U. S. helicopter pilot fly in support, but helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U. S. personnel. As observed by LTG Dave Palmer, to qualify an ARVN candidate for U. S. elicopter school, he first needed months of English language training to be able to follow the months-long training, and then additional field time to become proficient. In other words, adding new capabilities to the ARVN would often take two or more years. Palmer did not disagree that the first component, given time and resources, was achievable. Pacification, the second component, presented the real challenge it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always ha ve been benevolently active doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work.